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1 Introduction
Industry standards are developed and implemented to facilitate the interoperability of
products and increase their value to customers.1 They also have a social function by
improving the rate of diffusion of new technologies2 and eliminating mis-coordination
among producers.3 In this paper, we study how the effectiveness of the standardization
process is affected when new technologies included in standards are patent-protected.
We investigate to what extent the scope for “opportunistic” disclosure of these patents
undermines the work of a standard setting organization (SSO), a forum for reaching
consensus under competitive and strategic tensions.
Conflicting and vested interests, that may arise from problems of asymmetric in-
formation or tensions due to fierce product market competition, can have a significant
impact on the process. Simcoe (2008) and Farrell and Simcoe (2009) highlight the
impact of strategic interests on the delay of standard adoption. These strategic effects
are likely to be amplified if the standard incorporates intellectual property.4 Feld-
man, Graham, and Simcoe (2009), for example, document that patents disclosed to
SSOs are highly litigated.5 In a related context, Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007) an-
alyze the relationship between intellectual property disclosure rules and the level of
license prices. Such disclosure of intellectual property—especially when delayed—may
be used strategically as it can provide the patent holder with a bargaining leverage
1See, e.g., the discussions of standards and network effects in Scotchmer (2004) or Shapiro and
Varian (1998).
2Rysman and Simcoe (2008) show that patents disclosed to standard setting organizations (SSOs)
receive up to twice as many citations as other patents in the same sector. They conclude that such
institutions play a crucial role in leading to a bandwagon effect among adopters (especially in the ICT
industry).
3See the discussion in Farrell and Klemperer (2007:2026f) and the literature cited therein.
4See Weiss and Sirbu (1990:2026) or Farrell and Klemperer (2007).
5Moreover, Baron and Pohlmann (2010) study the effect of patent pools on patent disclosure and
find that patent pools result in more patent disclosure, suggesting opportunistic patent filings.
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over patent’s prospective users—a phenomenon often referred to as patent holdup or
patent ambush.6
In this paper, we endogenize the magnitude of patent holdup and study how patent
strength, the efficiency of the standardization process, and product-market competition
affect the strategic use of disclosure of intellectual property. We provide two results
concerning firms’ disclosure decisions. First, we find that in the presence of valid
intellectual property, patent holders strategically delay the disclosure of intellectual
property. Moreover, the propensity to delay disclosure is stronger in more productive
standardization bodies. We also study the impact of product market competition on
the development of the standardization process. In this respect, we find that harsh
competition inhibits even the start of the standardization process. As competition
gets softer, the standardization process is started, but the decision to disclose can be
constrained by the risk that other firms leave the SSO before a patent holder’s optimal
disclosure timing has arrived. Finally, soft competition allows patent holders to fully
exploit their bargaining leverage and postpone disclosure until the aspired stage.
We present a dynamic model with asymmetric information, based on Stein (2008),
in which two product-market competitors are engaged in the process of standardization.
They take turns in suggesting new ideas for standard improvements. We make two main
assumptions: First, ideas for improvements are complementary insofar as a firm can
find a new idea only if the other firm has suggested an idea in the previous round (e.g.,
6See Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro, and Sullivan (2007); Lemley and Shapiro (2007); Farrell and Shapiro
(2008); Ganglmair, Froeb, and Werden (2010); Shapiro (2010); Tarantino (2011), among others. The
patent holdup problem is a greatly debated issue in the law and economics literature, and with dis-
sonant positions. To give two remarkable examples, Lemley and Shapiro (2007) stress the adverse
impact of holdup on licensing decisions in industries with complex products, whereas Geradin (2009)
claims that the real impact of patent holdup on the correct functioning of standard setting organiza-
tions is over-rated. We take a neutral stance and assume that a holdup problem may arise, although
its incidence on the standard setting process is endogenous and depends on the timing of patent
disclosure.
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Stein, 2008; Hellmann and Perotti, 2010).7 Second, the model’s information structure
is asymmetric. We assume that the initial standard technologies are patent-protected
and respective patent holders must decide when to disclose this information to the
other participants. Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007:911) report that “due to the [. . . ]
complexity of patent portfolios, rivals frequently could not determine ‘the needle in
the haystack’: that is, which patents were relevant to a given standardization effort.”8
Therefore, unless disclosed by its holder, members of an SSO may at best have a prior
belief as to whether or not a given (essential) technology in the standard is patent
protected.9
The owner of intellectual property of such an essential part of the standard can
demand the payment of license fees from other firms producing within the standard.
These license fees depend on the patent holder’s bargaining leverage as a result of the
technology users’ lock-in. Such lock-in arises from firms relying on the standard to
be adopted and then manufacturing final products based on the present state of the
not yet adopted standard proposal.10 We assume that the extent of lock-in increases
the later the patent holder discloses its intellectual property. The existing literature
on the ensuing problem of patent holdup in standard setting11 assumes the magnitude
7The model in Hellmann and Perotti (2010) shares many features with Stein (2008). We work with
the latter because it can easily be extended to model standard setting with intellectual property.
8The identification of a patent that is relevant to the development of a specific standard imposes
significant search costs on the firms participating in an SSO, especially when firms with very large
patent portfolios are involved in the discussion. Search costs may turn out to be burdensome even for
the patent holders. During a public hearing conducted by the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission in 2007, expert panelists reported that “[c]omplying with different disclosure poli-
cies in different SSOs can be costly to IP holders, especially for those with large patent portfolios,”
and that “if an SSO’s disclosure policy is too burdensome, IP holders won’t come to the table because
of the high cost.” (U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, 2007:43)
9Kobayashi and Wright (2009) or Shapiro (2010) assume na¨ıve manufacturers who are not aware
of the possibility of the technology being patent protected.
10DeLacey, Herman, Kiron, and Lerner (2006) document the long development of the xDSL and
IEEE 802.11 standards. More specifically, when discussing the process of standard 802.11n definition
(which improved the 802.11g version), DeLacey, Herman, Kiron, and Lerner (2006:13ff) present the
case of Belkin, which had been shipping “pre-N” products for over a year before the final specification
of the standard was certified.
11Remarkably, many of the cases regarding SSOs deal with disclosure issues: In the
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of holdup to be exogenous. In this paper we model the decision to disclose intellec-
tual property (with exogenous patent strength (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008)) and thus
endogenize the degree of lock-in and holdup, and consequently the size of license fees.
We analyze the patent holder’s disclosure decision in two regimes, the waiver and
the no-waiver regime. For the waiver regime we assume that if the patent holder fails
to disclose its patent before the end of the standardization process, its intellectual
property is treated as if waived.12 This implies that the firm loses its bargaining
leverage—and thus its license fee revenues—over users of the standard. In the no-
waiver regime, patent holders can disclose before or after the end of the standardization
process, without the implied waiver and the loss of their bargaining leverage. These
two regimes naturally map into the two main disclosure rules employed by SSOs.13
Our model design gives rise to two tradeoffs to be analyzed. The first tradeoff is—
though in a different context—analyzed in Stein (2008) and concerns firms’ decisions
to communicate respective ideas for standard improvement. A longer standardiza-
tion process increases the quality of the standard, so firms share a common interest
in continuing communication as long as possible. On the other hand, if a firm stops
FTC matters against Dell Computer Corp. (FTC order Dell Computer Corp., FTC
Docket NO. C-3658, 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996)) and Rambus Inc., FTC v. Rambus Inc.,
522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the European Commission against Rambus (“Antitrust:
Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections to Rambus”, MEMO/07/330,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/330), or Broadcom
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007), accusers contended that patentees
failed to comply to the disclosure rule of the SSO where the standardization process took place.
12For example, see the European Commission’s press release on the Rambus case (“Antitrust:
Commission accepts commitments from Rambus lowering memory chip royalty rates”, IP/09/1897,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1897) and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision on Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., Docket Num-
ber 07-1545. Nos. 2007-1545, 2008-1162. http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-federal-circuit/1150919.html
(“[W]e agree with the district court that, ‘[a] duty to speak can arise from a group relationship in which
the working policy of disclosure of related intellectual property rights (‘IPR’) is treated by the group
as a whole as imposing an obligation to disclose information [. . . ].’ [. . . ] In these circumstances, we
conclude that it was within the district court’s authority [. . . ] to determine that Qualcomm’s miscon-
duct falls within the doctrine of waiver. [. . . ] remand with instructions to enter an unenforceability
remedy limited in scope to any [standard]-compliant products.”).
13See Annex 2 in http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010 horizontals/microsoft en.pdf.
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communication and does not reveal a new idea for improvement, it gains a cost advan-
tage over its product-market rival. This latter effect introduces an incentive to halt
communication during the standardization process.
The second tradeoff concerns firms’ disclosure decision. In the waiver regime, by
disclosing early, the patent holder loses part of its bargaining leverage from patent
holdup. However, by delaying disclosure the patent holder runs the risk of not getting
to disclose in time before the standardization process stops because no new idea for
improvement arrives. Clearly, in the no-waiver regime there are no costs of not dis-
closing the patent, that is, there is no threat of losing one’s bargaining leverage when
missing the window of opportunity.
We derive our results by looking at two scenarios. First, we consider the case
in which a patent holder’s decision to disclose is not constrained by the other firm’s
incentives to communicate in the standardization process, meaning that the product
market rival does not want to stop the standardization process. This allows us to
analyze each patent holder’s aspired disclosure stage and derive conditions for delayed
disclosure. We then proceed to the case in which the disclosure decision is constrained
in the following sense: the other firm’s communication incentives may be binding and
do not enable a given patent holder to continue the standardization process until the
aspired disclosure stage. Explicitly accounting for the latter case, we are able to give
conditions under which the unconstrained results cease to apply.
Our model suggests that a valid patent is a necessary condition for the patent
holder to delay disclosure, i.e., not disclose at the beginning of the standardization
process. We can further qualify this result to assess the impact of disclosure rules on
the decision to postpone disclosure. In the no-waiver regime, firms disclose respective
intellectual property only after the end of the standardization process. Instead, in the
waiver regime , while delayed, firms plan to reveal the existence of intellectual property
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before the end of the process. In the waiver regime, we also find that the propensity to
delay disclose is stronger in SSOs that exhibit a higher productivity, i.e., in which the
probability with which firms have ideas for further standard improvement, is bigger.
In this case, an increase in the productivity of the process implies a delay of disclosure.
The strength of firm i’s patent increases the incentives to delay firm i’s patent disclosure
if the relative gains from delaying offset the costs of time (that is, the risk that the
process stops beforehand). The propensity to delay disclosure of firm i is independent
of the strength of firm j’s patent. This results from the combined effect of two features
of the model. First, the (possible) existence of firm j’s intellectual property equally
affects the payoffs from disclosing right away and from delaying disclosure. Second, the
decision to disclose by i has no spillover on the decision taken by j. Finally, market
competition does not affect the aspired disclosure stage.
For a second set of results, we disentangle the effect of the degree of product mar-
ket competition on the functioning of the standardization process and the timing of
disclosure. We show that in a highly competitive industry cooperative standardiza-
tion cannot be sustained. Intuitively, strong competitive pressures impair the agents’
incentives to cooperate on the development of a standard. This is because if compet-
itive pressures are fierce, the gains from holdup cannot be large. Tough competition
implies that firms profits are modest, and so are the rents that can be extracted from
competitors via licensing. Conversely, as competition softens, larger product market
profits give a strong incentive to delay disclosure so to recoup higher licensing fees.
To our knowledge our model is the first to endogenize patent holdup in standard
setting. This means, given patent strength, bargaining leverage is contingent on when
the patented technology is included in the standard: the later the patent is disclosed
the more manufacturers are locked in and the greater is the threat of being held up in
ex-post license negotiations. However, our results contribute not only to the discussion
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of strategic patent disclosure and holdup in standard setting, but has implications for
the general literature on knowledge sharing and diffusion (Anton and Yao, 2002, 2004;
Haeussler, Jiang, Thursby, and Thursby, 2009; Hellmann and Perotti, 2010; Stein,
2008; von Hippel, 1987). von Hippel (1987), for instance, in an early contribution,
studies the problem of technical know-how trading among technicians of competing
firms. He shows, by means of case studies, that cooperative communication between
competitors can take place; such conversation, however, is not sustainable when very
harsh competition is at work.14 We deliver the analogous result that tough competition
impedes firms’ discussions and prevents cooperative standardization. With a focus on
the complementarity of information15, Haeussler, Jiang, Thursby, and Thursby (2009)
build a model of knowledge diffusion among academic scientists. Their model shares
with ours the feature that complementary information is needed to solve a problem
and that such information is exchanged between competing agents. They assume that
each agent can quit the information sharing game with its own solution to the problem,
whereas we rule this out; a successful standardization process requires collaboration of
all parties involved.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our extension of
the model by Stein (2008). In Section 3 we define the first best outcome and show that
in cooperative equilibrium a standardization process cannot be sustained if competition
is too fierce. In Section 4 we analyze firms’ incentives to continue communication after
all patents have been disclosed. In Section 5 we analyze non-cooperative equilibrium
disclosure when the firms’ communication incentives are not binding. In Section 6 we
explicitly model the case in which communication incentives may be binding and show
14von Hippel (1987) makes the example of the aerospace industry, where firms competing for an
important government contract report not to trade information with rivals.
15See also Hellmann and Perotti (2010) or Stein (2008).
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how they constrain patent holders’ disclosure decision. We conclude in Section 7. The
formal proofs of the results are relegated to the appendix.
2 Basic Model
We consider two product-market competitors, firm A and firm B, that take turns in
creating or improving an existing technology as industry standard. They do this by
exchanging ideas for improvement that arrive with exogenous probability. The process
is characterized by strict complementarity of ideas, meaning that if a new idea does not
arrive or one of the firms decides not to share a new idea with its competitor the process
stops. Once stopped, the standard then comprises the stock of ideas exchanged. The
larger the number of improvements, the more valuable the standard is to the firms. At
the same time, by not sharing an idea, a firm gains an advantage over its competitor.
Stein (2008) captures this tradeoff in his model of conversation among competitors.
We follow the notation and extend his analysis by adding intellectual property and its
disclosure to the model.
2.1 Information Structure
The firms take turns with A moving at stages t = 1, 3, 5, . . . and B moving at stages
t = 2, 4, 6, . . .. We denote the first stage at which a firm i gets to move by t0i so that
t0A = 1, t
0
B = 2, and Ti := {t0i , t0i + 2, t0i + 4, . . .}. At stage t = 1, firm A has access to
a patent-protected technology χ1, and firm B has prior beliefs pi
B > 0 this technology
is being protected by a patent. If, at t = 1, firm A shares this technology with firm B,
then B observes with probability p ∈ (0, 1) a technology or idea χ2 that improves firm
A’s technology and thus increases the value of the standard. Firm B happens to have a
patent on this technology χ2 with probability pi
A > 0. This piA is the prior probability
9
and firm A’s prior belief that χ2 is patent protected. All future ideas χt, t ≥ 3, are not
patent-protected. Beliefs piA and piB are common knowledge.
Once a new idea has arrived, firm A at any odd t ∈ TA and firm B at any even
t ∈ TB have three possible actions: (1) stop (not share χt), (2) continue (share χt but
not the fact that χt0i is patent-protected), or (3) disclose (share χt and, if not done
at an earlier stage, the fact that χt0i is patent-protected). Note that if firm i chooses
to continue but not to disclose the patent at t = t0i , it can reconsider and disclose at
any later t. A firm cannot credibly communicate that it does not have a patent on its
technology. We restrict firms’ precommitment as follows:
ASSUMPTION 1. Firms cannot at any time t precommit to disclose at t+k, k ≥ 2.
If at t a new idea has arrived and the firm decides to stop by not revealing the
idea, the process ends. This is because of the assumed strong complementarity of the
standardization process. If at t a new idea has arrived and the firm decides to either
disclose or continue by sharing the idea with its competitor, in t + 1 a new idea χt+1
will arrive with probability p. With probability 1 − p, no new idea arrives, and the
process stops—again, due to strict complementarity. Once the process ends, the firms’
payoffs are materialized. The structure of the game is depicted in Figure 1.16
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
16Note that only the part of the game tree with firm A having a patent is depicted as we are not
interested in firm A’s decision when he does not own a patent. (Firm B, when making her decision,
however, will have to account for the possibility that firm A does not own a patent on χ1. Because
of the one-sidedness of the picture, firm B’s information sets are not included.) As long as i has not
disclosed, firm j forms posterior beliefs pijt as to whether firm i’s initial technology is patent-protected.
Firm j’s posterior beliefs are given in brackets. Decision nodes without this bracket notation have
posterior beliefs of pijt = 1 because i has disclosed the patent.
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2.2 Payoffs
We assume that the value of the standard increases with the rounds of communication,
as more rounds imply more ideas of standard improvement. We denote the number of
ideas of improvement by nS ≥ 0. We use the product market setting in Stein (2008)
and allow firms to collect license fees for their intellectual property, if existent.
2.2.1 Product Market
The firms are competitors in the market for homogeneous good. A better standard,
with higher nS, results in lower costs of production. More specifically, having access
to an nS-standard, the parties can manufacture the product at cost 1− h(nS).
ASSUMPTION 2. h(nS) is increasing and continuous in nS with h(0) = 0 and
lim
nS→∞
h(nS) = 1.
A firm that has a new idea for standard improvement, but decides not to commu-
nicate it, manufactures the product at cost 1− h(nS + 1) < 1− h(nS) and has a cost
advantage over its rival because ni = nS + 1 > nS = nj, with i, j = A,B, i 6= j. Both
firms produce the good under standard nS, but firm i can produce at a lower cost due
to an additional unrevealed idea. If, instead, the standardization process stops because
a new idea does not arrive, then both firms have access to the same stock of ideas and
nA = nB = nS.
We assume that firms A and B each face a market of unit mass and that all cus-
tomers have a reservation value of one. Moreover, there is a fractional overlap of size
θ ∈ (0, 1) in A’s and B’s customer bases. In other words, firms A and B have a
monopoly on a fraction (1− θ) of their customers, but compete for the remaining frac-
tion θ. The products are otherwise undifferentiated and competition is a` la Bertrand.
12
These product market assumptions yield product market profits of
Ri = (1− θ)h(ni) + θmax {0, h(ni)− h(nj)} . (1)
The first part of equation (1) reflects the fact that for a fraction (1− θ) of its customers,
firm i is a monopolist and charges the full reservation value of one—with production
costs of 1− h(ni). The profits of firm i per customer are thus h(ni). On the remaining
fraction θ of its customer base—overlapping with j’s customer base—firm i makes a
profit only if its costs are strictly below those of j so that, by Bertrand competition,
it can make a price offer below firm j’s and h(ni) > h(nj).
2.2.2 License Fees
If firm i owns a patent on one of the technologies incorporated into the standard, it
can extract parts of firm j’s market profits as license fee. This potential for license
fees depends on whether or not firm i has disclosed its intellectual property and the
underlying rules of disclosure set by the standard-setting organization. We will consider
two regimes.
DEFINITION 1 (Disclosure Rules).
• No-Waiver Regime: Firms must disclose intellectual property of χt0i before or
after the standardization process has come to an end.
• Waiver Regime: Firms must disclose intellectual property before the standardiza-
tion process comes to an end. If patents on χt0i have not been disclosed, i.e., if
disclosure is not timely, these are considered to be waived.
The license fee firm i can extract from firm j depends on whether the firm has
timely disclosed (according to the disclosure rules), the degree of lock-in of firm j, and
13
the resulting bargaining leverage for firm i (i.e., holdup). Suppose firm i has disclosed
timely, then σi : (0, 1)× Ti → [0, 1] is the fraction of firm j’s profits firm i can extract
by means of license fees. It depends on (1) the strength αi ∈ (0, 1) of the patent of
firm i; and (2) the timing τi ∈ Ti of firm i’s disclosure.
ASSUMPTION 3 (License Fees).
1. σi(αi, τi) is continuous and increasing in αi ∈ [0, 1] and τi ∈ Ti;
2. σi(αi, τi) > 0 if and only if αi > 0 and τi > t
0
i ; σi(0, τi) = σi(αi, t
0
i ) = 0 otherwise;
3. limt→∞ σi(αi, t) = αi < 1;
4. If in the waiver regime disclosure of firm i is not timely, then σi(αi, τi) = 0.
The positive effect of αi on σi(αi, τi) captures the idea that firm i’s bargaining lever-
age over j will depend on how weak or strong the patent is expected to be (Farrell and
Shapiro, 2008). The positive effect of τi on σi(αi, τi) reflects the impact of lock-in into a
standard. As more and more ideas for improvement, χt, are added to the standard, on
top of patent-protected technologies χ1 and χ2, the longer the standardization process
continues, and the more likely firms will have invested in relationship-specific assets,
in reliance on the standard to be approved.17 Th fraction of firm j’s profits that firm
i can extract is bounded by i’s patent strength, αi.
Market profits Ri in (1) are the firms’ overall profits when σi and σj are equal to
zero. We denote the firms’ utility when accounting for license fees by Ui: Ui(i, j) is firm
i’s utility when both i and j have timely disclosed their intellectual property; Ui(i, 0)
is firm i’s utility when i has timely disclosed and j does not own intellectual property
or has not timely disclosed (in the waiver regime); Ui(0, j) is firm i’s utility when i
17See the discussion of the Belkin case in the introduction.
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has not timely disclosed (in the waiver regime) and j has timely disclosed; finally,
Ui(0, 0) = Ri.
Ui(i, j) = (1− σj(αj, τj))Ri + σi(αi, τi)Rj, (2)
Ui(i, 0) = Ri + σi(αi, τi)Rj, (3)
Ui(0, j) = (1− σj(αj, τj))Ri +Rj. (4)
3 First Best and Cooperative Equilibrium
In a first-best world, both firms communicate their respective ideas for standard im-
provement until a new idea fails to arrive. This maximizes the expected number of
ideas, nS, and minimizes production costs. Whether or not the firms disclose their
intellectual property has no impact on this expected value; disclosure has no social
value. This is because given a standard nS and possible cost-advantage for one firm,
nS + 1, we find that
UA(A,B) + UB(B,A) = UA(A, 0) + UB(0, A) =
UA(0, B) + UB(B, 0) = UA(0, 0) + UB(0, 0) = RA +RB. (5)
Before we analyze the firms’ incentives when standardization is non-cooperative, we
first consider standardization as a cooperative process and ask under what conditions
the first-best scenario can be implemented as cooperative equilibrium.
If the firms communicate their ideas until a new idea fails to arrive, then both have
the same number of ideas, nS, and their joint payoffs are
RA +RB = 2 (1− θ)h(nS). (6)
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If firm i at some point decides to stop rather than reveal a new idea, then ni = nj + 1.
Their joint payoffs in this case are
Ri +Rj = h(ni) + (1− 2θ)h(nj). (7)
We show in the following proposition that disclosure and communication of ideas are
not part of a cooperative equilibrium if θ is sufficiently high, with the critical value
strictly larger than 1/2. In other words, in a highly competitive industry, standard
setting cannot be sustained as cooperative equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1 (Cooperative Equilibrium). For sufficiently high values of θ so
that competition is too high, there is no communication in the cooperative equilibrium.
This critical value for θ is strictly larger than 1/2.
For the remainder of this paper we restrict attention to sufficiently low degrees
of competition. If communication for all t cannot be implemented in a cooperative
equilibrium, it will not be implementable in a non-cooperative equilibrium, which is
what we analyze in the next sections.
4 Post-Disclosure Communication
We first analyze the firms’ incentives to continue communication after all patents have
been disclosed, i.e., for t > max{τi, τj}. The analysis is analogous to the steps in Stein
(2008:2154-5) but for firm i extracting fraction σi(αi, τi) of j’s profits. In Proposition 2
we summarize the main results for post-disclosure communication: continued commu-
nication by both firms until a new idea fails to arrive is easier to sustain in the presence
of own intellectual property.
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Assume both firms have disclosed their patents at stage τi and τj, respectively. If
in period t > max{τi, τj} a new idea arrives, firm i either continues or stops. Suppose
both firms always continue until a new idea fails to arrive, then firm i’s expected payoffs
are given by
EtUi(continue@t|τi, τj) = [1− σj(αj, τj) + σi(αi, τi)] (1− θ)H(t) (8)
where
H(t) =
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ k) (9)
is increasing in p.18 With probability (1− p), there will be no further ideas after time
t, so the standard has nS = t components with a total cost-reducing value of h(t) for
both firms; with probability p (1− p), there will be exactly one further idea after t, so
the standard has t + 1 components with a total cost-reducing value of h(t + 1); with
probability p2 (1− p) there are exactly two further ideas, and so forth.
By contrast, suppose that firm i chooses to stop at stage t. The firm’s payoffs in
this case are equal to
Ui(stop@t|τi, τj) = (1− σj(αj, τj)) [h(t)− θh(t− 1)] + σi(αi, τi)(1− θ)h(t− 1). (10)
This expression reflects the fact that if firm i keeps idea χt to itself and has therefore
a production cost advantage over j. This allows firm i to not only earn a profit
of (1− θ)h(t) in the monopoly market, but also a profit of θ [h(t)− h(t− 1)] in the
competitive market, in which i underbids firm j by offering a price 1 − h(t − 1) that
is equal to firm j’s production costs. Because of j’s license fees, firm i keeps only a
18The derivative of H(t) with respect to p is equal to
∑∞
k=0 p
k
(
k(1−p)
p − 1
)
h(t + k), which, after
some manipulation, can be rewritten as
∑∞
k=0 (1 + k) p
k [h(t+ k + 1)− h(t+ k)] > 0 for all p > 0.
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fraction 1− σj(αj, τj) of its profits. In addition, firm i extracts a fraction σi(αi, τi) of
j’s profits (1− θ)h(t− 1) in j’s monopoly market.
For firm i to always continue the standardization process until a new idea fails
to arrive, EtUi(continue@t|τi, τj) ≥ Ui(stop@t|τi, τj) must hold for all values of t >
max{τi, τj}. This condition can be rearranged to read
(
1 +
σi(αi, τi)
1− σj(αj, τj)
)
H(t)− h(t− 1)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ . (11)
Note that in absence of firm i’s intellectual property the condition for the standardiza-
tion process to continue reads as condition (6) in Stein (2008), that is
H(t)− h(t− 1)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ . (12)
A comparison of conditions (11) and (12) gives the impression that the presence of firm
i’s intellectual property improves communication incentives. However, to establish the
impact of σi(αi, τi) and σj(αj, τj) on the relative gains from continue the process versus
stop it is more appropriate to compute how the difference between (8) and (10) varies
with the value σi(αi, τi) and σj(αj, τj). This is what we do to establish the comparative
statics results in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2 (Post-Disclosure Communication). If condition (11) is satisfied
for all values of t > max{τi, τj} and i, j = A,B, then firms will continue the stan-
dardization process until a new idea fails to arrive. Firm i’s communication incentive
constraint is less binding the stronger its own intellectual property and the later it
has disclosed its patent. Existence of firm j’s patent renders firm i’s communication
incentives more binding if (12) is satisfied.
After both patents have been disclosed, firm i’s communication incentives increase
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with its own patent strength and holdup potential (reflected by σi(αi, τi)). After the
firm has disclosed its patent, it can enforce its intellectual property by extracting a fee
whose total value increases with the value of the standard and thus the duration of the
standardization process. The existence of j’s intellectual property, on the other hand,
reduces firm i’s profits from both continue in equation (8) and stop in equation (10).
We show that as long as (12) is satisfied, the marginal decrease in firm i’s payoffs from
continue is larger than the marginal reduction in the payoffs from stop. This implies
that the gains from continuing the process are lower.
The intuition for the result that an increase in σj(αj, τj) reduces i’s gains from
continue is straightforward. It is related to the exacerbation of the expropriation
conduct faced by firm i. We also find that an increase in σj(αj, τj) can increase the
gains from continue. However, this is only possible if, in the baseline case without
intellectual property, firm i doees not find it profitable to continue the conversation
(that is, when (12) is violated).
5 Unconstrained Patent Disclosure
In this section we analyze how patent disclosure and the scope for holdup (by way
of license fees that increase with late disclosure) affect the firms’ incentives to com-
municate in a standardization process before patents have been disclosed. We start
with the simplifying assumptions that (1) after disclosure, both firms always continue
the conversation (that is, (11) holds true) and (2) before disclosure by firm i, firm j
will always continue and firm i’s disclosure decision is unconstrained by j’s behavior.
In Section 6 we explicitly account for j’s communication incentves to study firm i’s
constrained disclosure decision.
We ask the following: do firms ever have an incentive to delay disclosure? And if
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so, what are the conditions for such delayed disclosure? We look at both the no-waiver
regime and the waiver regime, so to draw a comparison between the consequences of
each rule on firms’ behavior in standard setting.
5.1 No-Waiver Regime
The no-waiver regime implies that if, by the time (a) a new idea fails to arrive in period
t or (b) one of the firms decides to stop, firm i has not yet disclosed its patent, it can
do so ex post in t so that σi(αi, t). Since there are no costs attached to late disclosure
in the no-waiver regime, firms who have not disclosed will find it profitable to disclose
once the standardization process has stopped. Moreover, as we show in Proposition 3,
firms will always delay disclosure of their patents and disclose once the process has
come to an end.
PROPOSITION 3 (Disclosure in No-Waiver Regime). In the no-waiver regime, if
it has a patent, firm i will always disclose after the standardization process has been
stopped or a new idea has failed to arrive.
The reason for this is straightforward and a formal proof omitted. Once firm i has
disclosed in τi, the fraction of firm j’s profits it can extract is σi(αi, τi). Continuing
communication increases the value of the standard and thus the firms’ market profits,
whereas fraction σi(αi, τi) is fixed for all t ≥ τi. Since σi(αi, τi) is increasing in τi and
late disclosure does not come at a cost, firm i strictly prefers later disclosure over early
disclosure. The latest disclosure date possible is when the process has come to an
end.19
19Proposition 3 implies that—given the communication condition in (17) below is satisfied—the
expected disclosure date coincides with the expected duration of the standardization process, E1τi =
1 +
∑∞
i=0 p
i(1− p)i = 11−p .
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By Proposition 3, disclose is strictly dominated by continue for both i and j. To
determine the condition for which firm i will continue and not stop,
EtU
NW
i (continue@t) ≥ UNWi (stop@t), (13)
suppose continue is the equilibrium strategy for both firms. Then by Proposition 3,
they will disclose once a new idea fails to arrive and firm i’s expected payoffs, at t, in
the no-waiver regime are
EtU
NW
i (continue@t) = (1− θ) H¯(t) (14)
with
H¯(t) = H(t) +
∞∑
k=0
[
σi(αi, t+ k)− piitσj(αj, t+ k)
]
pk (1− p)h(t+ k). (15)
Both σi(αi, t) and σj(αj, t) increase as the process continues and disclosure is delayed.
Expectations are taken both over the arrival of new ideas (with probability p) and firm
j having a patent. Note that firm i, if it has a patent, will extract σi(αi, t) from firm j’s
profits, and firm i anticipates, at t, that firm j has a patent with piit. Firm j extracts
σj(αj, t) of i’s profit with this probability pi
i
t.
Firm i’s expected payoffs from stop in t, so that σi(αi, t) and σj(αj, t), are
UNWi (stop@t) =
(
1− piitσj(αj, t)
)
[h(t)− θh(t− 1)] + σi(αi, t)(1− θ)h(t− 1). (16)
Firm i always continues and discloses once a new idea fails to arrive if condition (13),
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rewritten as
H¯(t)− (1 + σi(αi, t)− piitσj(αj, t))h(t− 1)
(1− piitσj(αj, t))(h(t)− h(t− 1))
≥ 1
1− θ . (17)
holds true for all t. We summarize the pre-disclosure communication incentives in the
no-waiver regime in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4 (Communication in No-Waiver Regime). If condition (17) is sat-
isfied for all t and i, j = A,B, then in the no-waiver regime firms will continue the
standardization process until a new idea fails to arrive, and only then disclose their
patents. Firm i’s communication incentive constraint is less binding the stronger its
own intellectual property. Existence of firm j’s intellectual property reduces firm i’s
communication incentives if
(1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
σj(αj, t+ k)p
k (1− p)h(t+ k) ≥ σj(αj, t) [h(t)− θh(t− 1)] .
As for the post-disclosure communication incentives (analyzed in Proposition 2),
the existence of own intellectual property increases firms’ incentives to continue the
standardization process. Conversely, the existence of firm j’s patent lowers firm i’s
incentives whenever an increase in σj(αj, τj) triggers a reduction of firm i’s exptected
payoffs from continue in equation (14) that outweighs the decrease of its payoffs from
stop in equation (16).
5.2 Waiver Regime
For the remainder of the paper we consider the waiver regime: if firms have not disclosed
their intellectual property by the time the standardization process comes to an end,
their patents are invalid. Unlike in the no-waiver regime, delaying disclosure, say from
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t to t + 2, comes at a cost. Given that firm j’s communication incentives are not
binding (it will always continue), with probability 1 − p2 firm i will not reach stage
t + 2 and will thus not get to disclose. It will then lose its bargaining leverage and
fraction σi(αi, t) of j’s profits. Conversely, by not delaying but disclosing in t, firm i
foregoes some license fees because σi(αi, t) < σi(αi, t + 2). In what follows below, we
show how firm i solves this tradeoff. We first consider the scenario where firm j has
not yet disclosed (firm i’s decision to disclose before j discloses) and then proceed to
the case where firm j’s has disclosed (firm i’s decision to disclose after firm j).
5.2.1 Firm i Discloses Before Firm j
Our approach to firm i’s disclosure decision is as follows: because at any t, firms cannot
commit to disclose at any t + k, k ≥ 2, firm i can either stop, disclose, or continue
and reconsider the disclosure decision in t + 2. It will delay disclosure if and only
if its expected payoffs from disclosure in t + 2 (continue in t and disclose in t + 2),
EtU
W
i (disclose@t + 2), are at least as high as the expected payoffs from disclosure in
t, EtU
W
i (disclose@t). Because of the lack of commitment, this does not imply that
firm i indeed discloses in t+ 2, but it will then reconsider its decision and again delay
disclosure if and only if Et+2U
W
i (disclose@t + 4) ≥ Et+2UWi (disclose@t + 2); and so
forth.
Firm i’s expected payoffs from disclosure in t (when both firms continue after
disclosure, i.e., when post-disclosure communication condition (11) is satisfied) are
EtU
W
i (disclose@t) = (1− θ)
[
H(t) + σi(αi, t)H(t)− piitH(t, τj)
]
. (18)
If firm i expects firm j to have no patent (with probability 1 − piit), then both firms
generate market profits of (1− θ)H(t), where firm i is able to extract a fraction of
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σi(αi, t) of firm j’s market profits. With probability pi
i
t firm i expects j to have a
patent, in which case firm j is able to extract
H(t, τj) = p
τj−tσj(αj, τj)H(τj) (19)
of firm i’s market profits—given an anticipated disclosure date τj. Firm i’s expected
payoffs from delayed disclosure in t+ 2 are
EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) = (1− θ)
[
H(t) + p2σi(αi, t+ 2)H(t+ 2)− piitH(t, τj)
]
. (20)
The payoffs from stop at t are
UWi (stop@t) = h(t)− θh(t− 1). (21)
For the results below we assume that both firms’ communication constraints are
satisfied. This implies that firm i will continue and delay disclosure for all t as long as
EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) ≥ EtUWi (disclose@t).
In Lemma 1 we show that with a valid patent, αi > 0, firm i will always delay
disclosure. This means, firm i’s disclosure date is τi ≥ t0i + 2. This is because i’s
payoffs from disclosure in t = t0i are strictly smaller than the payoffs from continuing
and disclosing in t = t0i + 2.
LEMMA 1. Given anticipated disclosure τj by firm j, firm i delays disclosure of its
patent so that τi ∈ Ti \ {t0i } if and only if αi > 0.
In the waiver regime, if the firm has a valid (but possibly weak) patent, it will not
disclose immediately. Unlike in the no-waiver regime, however, the firms will not wait
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until the standardization process has come to an end. If the process allows, meaning if
enough new ideas arrive, firm i will always find it optimal to disclose before the process
stops. We refer to this date of disclosure as aspired disclosure date, τ ∗i . If the process
comes to an end before this t = τ ∗i , then the aspired disclosure date cannot be realized,
and the patent is not disclosed. We summarize in Lemma 2.
LEMMA 2. The aspired disclosure date, τ ∗i > t
0
i , is finite.
We can now characterize firm i’s optimal aspired disclosure date in the waiver
regime when communication incentives are not binding, i.e., the only reason why the
standardization process stops is when a new idea fails to arrive.
PROPOSITION 5 (Unconstrained Disclosure). Let both firms’ pre-disclosure com-
munication incentives be satisfied. Firm i delays disclosure of valid intellectual property
but plans to disclose at a finite stage τ ∗i . This aspired disclosure date τ
∗
i is equal to the
smallest tˆi ∈ Ti \ {t0i } such that
EtU
W
i (disclose@t) < EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) (22)
for all t0i ≤ t < tˆi, and > for some tˆi ≤ t < tˆi + 2.
Firm i’s disclosure, if it has a patent, is timely, i.e., not subject to the implied
waiver in Assumption 3, with probability pτ
∗
i . In Corollary 1, we provide comparative
statics for τ ∗i , reflecting firm i’s propensity to delay disclosure with respect to p, αi,
αj, and θ.
COROLLARY 1. If p > 1/2 firm i’s propensity to delay disclosure is increasing in
the success probability p. Firm i’s propensity to delay disclosure is increasing in firm
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i’s patent strength αi if and only if
σαii (αi, tˆi)
σαii (αi, tˆi + 2)
· H(tˆi)
H(tˆi + 2)
< p2 (23)
where σαii (αi, t) is the partial derivative of σi(αi, t) with respect to αi. Firm j’s intel-
lectual property, αj, and the degree of market competition, θ, have no effect on firm i’s
aspired disclosure date.
These results warrant a few words of discussion. First, firm i is more likely to delay
disclosure the higher the probability of new ideas arriving. A higher p increases both
the expected profits from disclosing in t and the payoffs from disclosing in t+2. Indeed,
if firm i decides to delay disclosure in t, the associated costs of not arriving in t+2 and
thus losing the license fees due to the implied waiver are lower.20 We show that if the
baseline value of p is sufficiently high (that is, higher than 1/2), then the propensity
to delay disclosure increases in p. Second, a stronger patent increases the gains from
disclosing in t and from disclosing in t + 2, where the latter are discounted by arrival
probability p2. Condition (23) implies that if the difference of marginal license fees in
t + 2 and t is sufficiently large to offset the costs of time, p2, higher patent strength
results in later delay.
The results in Proposition 5 apply to the situation where both firms’ communication
constraints are satisfied, i.e., both firms will not stop the standardization process. This
means, before disclosure, not only are the expected payoffs from delaying at least as
high as the expected payoffs from immediate disclosure in t, but expected payoffs from
delaying disclosure in (20) must be at least as high as the payoffs from stopping in
20This is because the probability 1− p2 of not reaching t+ 2 is decreasing in p.
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(21). This is the case if
H(t)− h(t− 1) + p2σi(αi, t+ 2)H(t+ 2)− piitH(t, τj)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ . (24)
A firm’s own intellectual property thus relaxes its communication constraint, whereas
firm j’s intellectual property (both beliefs piit and license fee σj(αj, τj)H(τj)) renders
the constraint more binding, as can be seen when using the expression for H(t, τj) in
(19).
Condition (24) can be rewritten for firm j. We discuss in Section 6 how this com-
munication restriction on j’s side will affect firm i’s optimal aspired patent disclosure.
5.2.2 Firm i Discloses After Firm j
We now consider the case in which firm j has already disclosed the patent, so that
piit = 1 for all t > τj, when firm i faces this decision. Firm i’s payoffs in t ≥ τj + 1 are
EtU
W
i (disclose@t|τj) = (1− θ) [H(t) + (σi(αi, t)− σj(αj, τj))H(t)] (25)
EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2|τj) = (1− θ)
[
H(t) + p2σi(αi, t+ 2)H(t+ 2)
− σj(αj, τj)H(t)
]
(26)
UWi (stop@t|τj) = (1− σj(αj, τj)) [h(t)− θh(t− 1)] (27)
for disclose at t, for continue and disclose at t+ 2, and for stop at t.
Again, for the results that follow we assume that both firms’ communication con-
straints are satisfied and stop is dominated by communication. This implies that firm
i will continue and delay disclosure for all t > τj as long as
EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2|τj) ≥ EtUWi (disclose@t|τj).
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Lemma 3 that shows delayed disclosure is analogous to Lemma 1. Note that because
firm i discloses once firm j discloses, firm i = A will always delay disclosure by this
assumption. In the lemma we show that firm i = B delays disclosure because it is
optimal to do so.
LEMMA 3. Given disclosure by firm A in τA, firm B delays disclosure of its patent
so that τB > t
0
B.
Lemma 4 is analogous to Lemma 2.
LEMMA 4. Given disclosure by firm j in τj, the aspired disclosure date of firm i,
τ ∗i (τj) > t
0
i , is finite.
We can now summarize firm i’s disclosure decision in the waiver regime once firm
j has disclosed.
PROPOSITION 6 (Unconstrained Disclosure in t > τj). Suppose firm j has disclosed
in τj and let both firms’ pre-disclosure communication constraints be satisfied for all
t > τj. Firm i discloses its valid intellectual property at a finite stage τ
∗
i (τj). This
aspired disclosure date τ ∗i (τj) is equal to the smallest tˆi ∈ Ti \ {t : t ∈ Ti, t ≤ τj} such
that
EtU
W
i (disclose@t|τj) < EtUWi (disclose@t+ 2|τj) (28)
for all τj < t < tˆi, and ≥ for some t ≥ tˆi.
We show in Corollary 2 that disclosure by j does not affect firm i’s aspired disclosure
date. It follows that the comparative statics from Corollary 1 for τ ∗i also apply to τ
∗
i (τj).
COROLLARY 2. τ ∗i = τ
∗
i (τj) for all t
0
j < τj < τ
∗
i (τj).
As for the firm’s communication incentive constraints: we studied firm i’s commu-
nication incentives in Section 4 and provided firm i’s constraint in condition (11). The
28
same condition applies to firm j after firm both firms have disclosed. The incentives
for firm j before i discloses are given in equation (24) for firm j instead of i.
6 Constrained Patent Disclosure in Waiver Regime
The results in Propositions 5 and 6 present firm i’s planned or aspired date of disclosure
in the waiver regime when it expects firm j to always continue so that the standard-
ization process stops only if a new idea fails to arrive. Firm i is thus unconstrained in
the sense that firm j’s actions will not affect its optimal disclosure decision. In this
section, we now explicitly account for j’s communication incentives and study how the
threat of firm j stopping the standardization process affects firm i’s disclosure decision.
We again consider the scenario in which firm i discloses before firm j under a waiver
regime. Firm j will continue the standardization process and reveal any new idea as it
arrives if
H(t)− h(t− 1) + p2σj(αj, t+ 2)H(t+ 2)− pijtH(t, τi)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ (29)
holds true given anticipated disclosure by firm i at stage τi.
21 Let
pij∗t (τi) =
(1− θ) [H(t) + p2σj(αj, t+ 2)H(t+ 2)]− [h(t)− θh(t− 1)]
(1− θ)H(t, τi) (30)
be defined such that (29) holds for all pijt ≤ pij∗t (τi) (and with strict equality for pijt =
pij∗t (τi)). Intuitively, firm j is the more inclined to continue the standardization process
the lower is its belief pijt that firm i owns a patent. pi
j∗
t (τi) ≥ 0 if
H(t)− h(t− 1) + p2σj(αj, t+ 2)H(t+ 2)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ (31)
21Condition (29) for firm j is the analogous to condition (24) for firm i.
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(pij∗t (τi) = 0 if (31) holds with equality), and pi
j∗
t (τi) ≤ 1 if
H(t)− h(t− 1) + p2σj(αj, t+ 2)H(t+ 2)−H(t, τi)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≤
1
1− θ (32)
(pij∗t (τi) = 1 if (32) holds with equality). Moreover, pi
j∗
t (τi) ∈ (0, 1) if both (31) and (32)
hold with strict inequality. Conditions (31) and (32) give rise to the three following
cases:
Case 1: Both condition (31) and condition (32) are satisfied so that pij∗t (τi) ∈ [0, 1].
Firm j continues in t if pijt ≤ pij∗t (τi) and stops otherwise.
Case 2: Condition (31) is satisfied and condition (32) is violated so that pij∗t (τi) > 1.
Firm j continues in t for all pijt ∈ [0, 1].
Case 3: Condition (31) is violated and condition (32) is satisfied so that pij∗t (τi) < 0.
No pijt ∈ [0, 1] exists such that firm j continues in t.
We are interested in how firm j’s communication incentives (summarized by the
three cases above) affect firm i’s patent disclosure decision. For that we assume that
firm i indeed has a patent and that its communication incentives in (24) are satisfied
for t ≤ τ ∗i , i.e., it is willing to continue the standardization process until τ ∗i . Note that
firm j’s behavior in the three cases depends on its beliefs pijt in t. If it believes firm i
to not be a patent holder, firm j expects firm i to continue if
H(t)− h(t− 1)− piitH(t, τj)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ (33)
and condition (33) is more restrictive than (24). This implies that if (33) is violated,
but firm i continues, then it must be the case that firm i indeed holds a patent; and
firm j updates its beliefs accordingly.
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In Lemma 5, we characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the disclosure
game depicted in Figure 1 in cases 1 and 2 and assuming that (33) holds, so that
firm j cannot infer from firm i’s decision to continue whether or not firm i is a patent
holder. The equilibrium disclosure stage, denoted by τ˜i, is such that firm j continues
for all t ≤ τ˜i − 1, firm i discloses at t = τ˜i, and firm j’s beliefs are consistent with firm
i’s choices. We assume that both firms will continue after disclosure; condition (11)
holds for both i and j for all t > max {τ˜i, τ˜j}.
LEMMA 5 (Cases 1 and 2). Let the firms’ post-disclosure communication constraints
in (11) be satisfied. Moreover, let condition (33) be satisfied for all t < τ ∗i , where τ
∗
i is
the aspired disclosure date defined in Proposition 5. In Case 1, equilibrium disclosure
is at stage τ˜i ≤ τ ∗i where τ˜i is the highest τ ′i ≥ t0i + 2 such that
pij ≤ min
{
pij∗
t0j+k
(τ ′i) : ∀t0j + k < τ ′i with even k ≥ 0
}
.
If no such τ ′i > t
0
i exists, then disclosure is not delayed, τ˜i = t
0
i . In Case 2, equilibrium
disclosure τ˜i is at stage τ
∗
i .
Case 1 has the potential to give rise to constrained disclosure by firm i, while in case
2 firm j’s communication incentives are not an issue (as was our working assumption
in the previous section). The intuition for the result relative to case 1 in Lemma 5 is
straightforward. First, note that firm i will disclose at some stage t′ if it anticipates
that firm j will stop in t′ + 1. Otherwise, firm i will lose its intellectual property due
to the implied waiver in the waiver regime. Firm j will not stop but continue only
if its beliefs pijt′+1 are sufficiently low, i.e., below the critical value in (30). Now, if at
stage t = 1, firm i continues, then firm j cannot update its beliefs because both the
patent holder firm i (with prior probability pij) and, by (33), the non-patent holder
firm i (with prior probability 1 − pij) will continue. In that case, firm j’s posterior at
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t = 2 is equal to the prior, pij. In t = 3, if firm i anticipates that this pij is less than j′s
critical value in t = 4, firm i will continue in t = 3. Again, firm j cannot update beliefs,
and the posterior in t = 4 is equal to j’s prior belief. Firm i will wind up postponing
disclosure as much as possible (but not later than τ ∗i ) and disclose at the last stage
for which the prior does not exceed j’s critical value, pij∗t (τ˜i), that is evaluated at this
equilibrium disclosure stage.
In Lemma 6, we discuss case 3 in which (31) is violated for all t < τ ∗i . This implies
that (33) is violated, because (33) is more stringent than (31).
LEMMA 6 (Case 3). Let (11) be satisfied, and let (33) be violated for all t < τ ∗i
where τ ∗i is the aspired disclosure date defined in Proposition 5. In case 3 equilibrium
disclosure τ˜i is at stage t
0
i .
The result in Lemma 6 has implications for the impact of the degree of product
market competition on disclosure. For degrees of competition sufficiently high, such
that (32) is satisfied, but (31) and (33) are violated, we observe immediate disclosure.
Firm i forsakes its rent-seeking possibilities to disclose. The intuition is that if compe-
tition is sufficiently fierce, firm j’s monopoly profits are relatively low. Because firm i
can extract rents only from j’s monopoly profits—the parties’ profits from the market
on which they compete are small—if competition is fierce the gains from license fees
are small and more than outweighed by the expected costs of losing license fees from
the implied waiver.
Finally, in Lemma 7, we characterize the equilibrium disclosure decision if (31) and
(32) are satisfied for all t < τ ∗i , but (33) is violated for some t < τ
∗
i .
LEMMA 7. Consider case 1 and let condition (33) be violated for some t < τ ∗i ,
where τ ∗i is the aspired disclosure date defined in Proposition 5. Two cases can be
distinguished:
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(a) If there exists an integer t′ ≥ t0i such that (33) is violated for t ≤ t′ and (33) is
satisfied for all t > t′, then equilibrium disclosure τ˜i is at stage τ ∗i .
(b) If there exists an integer t′ > t0i such that (33) is satisfied for t ≤ t′ and (33) is
violated for all t > t′, and pij ≤ min
{
pij∗
t0j+k
(t′) : ∀t0j + k ≤ t′ with even k ≥ 0
}
,
but pij > pij∗t′+1(τ
∗
i ), then equilibrium disclosure τ˜i is at stage τ˜i = t
′. Conversely,
if pij ≤ pij∗t′+1(τ ∗i ) then equilibrium disclosure τ˜i is at τ ∗i .
Lemma 7 completes the analysis of the cases in which firm j’s communication incen-
tives can constrain firm i disclosure decision.22 In Lemma 6, although (33) is violated,
disclosure is never delayed because (32) is always violated and thus communication is
not sustainable. In Lemma 7, (32) is satisfied. So, in the range of values of t in which
(33) is violated firm j exploits the fact that a non-patent holder does not continue
in order to screen firm i’s type. In sub-case (a) this leads to unconstrained disclo-
sure, whereas in sub-case (b) equilibrium disclosure is at the lowest t = τ ′i such that
communication can be sustained.
PROPOSITION 7. Condition (31) is a necessary condition for equilibrium disclosure
to be unconstrained in an environment with Bayesian updating. If (31) holds, firm j
has incentive to participate in the standardization process even when it expects firm i
to be a patent holder.
Proposition 7 uses the results in Lemmata 5, 6, and 7 to establish the necessary
condition for disclosure to be at τ ∗i , as determined in Proposition 5, and unconstrained.
In particular, if (31) is not satisfied (as in Lemma 6) disclosure at τ ∗i is unfeasible.
However, even if (31) holds, Lemmata 5 and 7 show that disclosure may still not be at
τ ∗i , depending on condition (33).
22For the case in which (31) holds whereas (32) and (33) are violated the analysis from case 2
applies, and equilibrium disclosure τ˜i is always at stage τ
∗
i .
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(31) is the condition that guarantees that the threshold value for j’s beliefs (pij∗t (τi))
lies into the unit interval, so that if pijt ≤ pij∗t (τi) firm j is willing to sustain the
standardization process even in the presence of a patent holder i1. Due to the relevance
of (31) in this setting, it is important to discuss how the validity of the condition is
affected by three of the exogenous parameters of the model, p, αj and θ, for a given
equilibrium value of τi. On the one hand, an increase of the degree of competition, θ,
restrains the validity of (31), by increasing the RHS of the condition. On the other
hand, if αj and p increase, the condition is relaxed. If αj increases, then σj(αj, t)
increases, and so does the LHS of the inequality. Intuitively, a stronger patent of
firm j increases the leverage bargaining power of firm j. Finally, the impact of the
standardization baseline productivity, the arrival probability p, is straightforward as it
increases the LHS of the condition. The intuition is that if the process productivity is
higher, the incentive to continue is stronger.
Finally, the analysis of constrained disclosure in the scenario featuring firm i dis-
closing after firm j under a waiver regime is equivalent to the one above, in which
firm i discloses before firm j under a waiver regime. Under the assumption that firm i
continues the conversation until disclosure and ex-post communication incentives are
sound, firm j will continue the standardization process if (29) and a non-patent holder
i continues if (33). The relevant conditions are therefore qualitatively analogous to
(30), (31), and (32), where the candidate for the aspired disclosure stage is as defined
in Proposition 6 instead of Proposition 5.
7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
We present a model of standardization with two-sided asymmetric information about
the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms’
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incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard and (b)
firms’ decisions to disclose the existence of intellctual property to other participants of
the standardization process.
Communication Incentives: We find that a firm i’s incentives to reveal ideas for
stnadard improvement and thus continue the standardization process are spurred by the
existence of its own intellectual property (see Propositions 2 and 4, and the discussion
following (24)). Also, if the degree of product market competition θ rises, communi-
cation incentives become more binding, thereby threatening the sustainability of the
standardization process.
Disclosure Decision: Two main regimes for the disclosure rule are considered, the
waiver and the no-waiver regime. In the no-waiver regime, we find that disclosure takes
place after the end of the standardization process. Conversely, for the waiver regime
we find the following:
For unconstrained disclosure, we show that (1) firms want to strategically postpone
disclosure provided their intellectual property is valid, and (2) they eventually plan to
reveal the existence of respective intellectual property before the end of the process.
The analysis of the propensity to disclose allows us to further qualify this result. First,
we show that disclosure is more likely to be delayed in more productive, i.e., innovative,
SSOs. Second, the strength of firm i’s patent further delays disclosure if the gains from
postponing (in terms of greater bargaining leverage) offset the cost of time (related to
the likelihood that the process stops). Third, the strength of another firm j’s patent has
no impact on firm i’s propensity to disclose. Fourth, disclosure is independent of the
degree of market competition. For constrained disclosure, we investigate under which
conditions the results derived in the unconstrained scenario remain valid. We provide a
necessary condition for firm i’s disclosure to be unconstrained in an environment with
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Bayesian updating. In other words, there exists a non-empty range of values of firm
j’s beliefs for which the standardization process can continue up to firm i’s aspired
disclosure stage τ ∗i .
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We assume a cooperative equilibrium exists, implying that communication (continue
or disclose) of ideas for inprovement at all stages, until a new idea fails to arrive. We show
that for sufficiently high θ the joint payoffs from continuing communication are smaller than
from not continuing, i.e.,
EUC(continue@t) < UC(stop@t) (A.1)
for some t. The joint payoffs from continuing are
EUC(continue@t) = 2 (1− θ)
∞∑
i=0
pi (1− p)h(t+ i),
the joint payoffs from stopping are UC(stop@t) = h(t)+(1− 2θ)h(t−1). By h(t) > h(t−1),
UC(stop@t) > 0 for all θ; EUC(continue@t) = 0 for θ = 1 and strictly positive otherwise.
The critical value θC(p, h(·)) (for which EUC(continue@t) = UC(stop@t)) is strictly smaller
than unity so that there are some θ > θC(p, h(·)) for which (A.1) holds. Note, also, that this
critical value is strictly larger than 0.5. Suppose for a moment that
EU˜C(continue@t) = 2 (1− θ)
∞∑
i=0
pi (1− p)h(t) = 2 (1− θ)h(t).
EU˜C(continue@t) = UC(stop@t) for θ = 0.5, and the condition in equation (A.1) holds for
θ > 0.5. Because h(t) < h(t + i) for all i > 0, EUC(continue@t) > EU˜C(continue@t) and
θC(p, h(·)) > 0.5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The first part is by Proposition 2 in Stein (2008:2155). To assess the impact of
σi(αi, τi) and σj(αj , τj) on communication incentives, rewrite the difference between (8) and
(10) as
(1− σj(αj , τj)) [(1− θ)H(t)− [h(t)− θh(t− 1)]] +
σi(αi, τi) (1− θ) [H(t)− h(t− 1)] . (A.2)
Claim 1: If σi(αi, τi) increases, then the difference in (A.2) increases because h(t+k) > h(t−1)
for all k ≥ 0 (by h(t) increasing in t in Assumption 2) and thus
H(t) =
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ k) >
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t− 1).
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The positive effect of αi and τi on σi(αi, τi) by Assumption 3 establishes the proof of the
impact of σi(αi, τi).
Claim 2: If σj(αj , τj) increases, then (A.2) decreases if and only if
(1− θ)H(t)− [(h(t)− θh(t− 1)] ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
H(t)− h(t− 1)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ .
The latter condition is equivalent to (12), establishing the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the first part of the claim is by Stein (2008:2155).
Claim 1: Firm i’s intellectual property increases its communication incentives as the differ-
ence between (14) and (16) is higher for σi(αi, t+ k) > 0 than for σi(αi, t+ k) = 0 if
∞∑
k=0
σi(αi, t+ k)p
k (1− p)h(t+ k) ≥ σi(αi, t)
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ k) >
σi(αi, t)
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t− 1) = σi(αi, t)h(t− 1),
or, equivalently, if
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p) [h(t+ k)− h(t− 1)] > 0,
which, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, is positive for all k ≥ 0.
Claim 2: Repeating the same exercise, we find that for σj(αj , t + k) > 0 firm i has weaker
incentives to continue than for σj(αj , t+ k) = 0, if
(1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
σj(αj , t+ k)p
k (1− p)h(t+ k) ≥ σj(αj , t) [h(t)− θh(t− 1)] ,
establishing the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. At t = t0i (the first stage firm i gets to move), immediate disclosure by firm i yields
expected payoffs of
Et0i
UWi (disclose@t
0
i ) = (1− θ)
[
H(t0i )− piit0iH(t
0
i , τj)
]
,
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because σi(αi, t
0
i ) = 0. Delaying disclosure one round, so that i discloses at t = t
0
i + 2, yields
expected payoffs (evaluated at t = t0i ) of
Et0i
UWi (disclose@t
0
i + 2) = (1− θ)
[
H(t0i ) + p
2σi(αi, t
0
i + 2)H(t
0
i + 2)−
piit0i
H(t0i , τj)
]
.
Disclose at t = t0i is dominated by disclose at t = t
0
i + 2 for all σi > 0 because p > 0 and
Et0i
UWi (disclose@t
0
i ) = (1− θ)
[
H(t0i )− piit0iH(t
0
i , τj)
]
< (1− θ)
[
H(t0i )− piit0iH(t
0
i , τj)
]
+ (1− θ) p2σi(αi, t0i + 2)H(t0i )
= Et0i
Ui(disclose@t
0
i + 2).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that t ∈ (t0i ,∞) ⊂ R+. Con-
sider the following properties of the expected payoff functions EtU
W
i (disclose@t) in equa-
tion (18) and EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) in equation (20).
P1. EtU
W
i (disclose@t) lies in a bounded space because σi(αi, t) and h(t) are bounded and
continuous functions, and H(t) =
∑∞
k p
k (1− p)h(t+ k) and H(t, τj) (defined in (19))
are bounded sequences.
P2. Because lim
t→∞h(t+ k) = 1 and limt→∞σi(αi, t) = αi for all k ≥ 0, we get
lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t) = (1− θ)
[
1 + αi − p∆τjαj lim
t→∞pi
i
t
]
,
lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) = (1− θ)
[
1 + p2αi − p∆τjαj lim
t→∞pi
i
t
]
,
with ∆τj := τj − t > 0 and p∆τjαj lim
t→∞pi
i
t <∞ as piit ∈ [0, 1].
If αi > 0, because p < 1, in the limit the expected payoffs from delaying disclosure one round
are strictly smaller than the payoffs from disclosing right away,
lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t) > lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2). (A.3)
From Lemma 1 we know that in t = t0i firm i will delay disclosure (if αi > 0) because
Et0i
UWi (disclose@t
0
i ) < Et0i
UWi (disclose@t
0
i +2); condition (A.3) implies that in the limit firm
i will not delay disclosure. By the intermediate value theorem (and if EtU
W
i (disclose@t) and
EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) intersect at most once), there exists a finite value of tˆi > t
0
i such that
EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) > EtU
W
i (disclose@t) for all t
0
i < t < tˆi and EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) ≤
EtU
W
i (disclose@t) for all t ≥ tˆi. Setting τ∗i = tˆi establishes the proof.
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If EtU
W
i (disclose@t) and EtU
W
i (disclose@t + 2) intersect more than once, there exist
multiple finite values of tˆi > t
0
i such that EtU
W
i (disclose@t + 2) > EtU
W
i (disclose@t) for
some t < tˆi and EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2) ≤ EtUWi (disclose@t) for some t ≥ tˆi. Then τ∗i is the
smallest of these tˆi. This is because, by Assumption 1, firm i cannot commit to disclose in
t+k for any k ≥ 2. Once delaying disclosure one round is less profitable than disclosing right
away, firm i will disclose because delaying disclosure more than one round (so that disclosure
in t+ 4 or t+ 6) is not an option. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. By Lemma 5, tˆi is such that
Fi := EtˆiU
W
i (disclose@tˆi)− EtˆiUWi (disclose@tˆi + 2) = 0.
By the implicit function theorem,
dtˆi
dp
= − ∂Fi
∂p
/
∂Fi
∂tˆi
and
dtˆi
dαi
= − ∂Fi
∂αi
/
∂Fi
∂tˆi
.
Claim 1: By definition of tˆi, Fi is increasing in t at tˆi;
∂Fi
∂tˆi
> 0. Moreover,
∂Fi
∂p
=
EtˆiUi(disclose@tˆi)
∂p
− EtˆiUi(disclose@tˆi + 2)
∂p
,
with
∂EtˆiU
W
i (disclose@tˆi)
∂p
= (1− θ)
[ (
1 + σi(αi, tˆi)
) ∞∑
k=0
(1 + k) pk
[
h(tˆi + k + 1)− h(tˆi + k)
]−
∂
∂p
pii
tˆi
H(tˆi, τj)
]
(A.4)
and
EtˆiU
W
i (disclose@tˆi + 2)
∂p
= (1− θ)
{ ∞∑
k=0
(1 + k) pk
[
h(tˆi + k + 1)− h(tˆi + k)
]
+
p2σi(αi, tˆi + 2)
∞∑
k=0
(1 + k) pk
[
h(tˆi + k + 3)− h(tˆi + k + 2)
]
+ 2pσi(αi, tˆi + 2)H(tˆi + 2)−
∂
∂p
pii
tˆi
H(tˆi, τj)
}
. (A.5)
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A sufficient condition for (A.5) to be bigger than (A.4) is that
∞∑
k=0
(1 + k) pk
[
h(tˆi + k + 3)− h(tˆi + k + 2)
]
+ 2pH(tˆi + 2) >
∞∑
k=0
(1 + k) pk
[
h(tˆi + k + 1)− h(tˆi + k)
]
, (A.6)
which simplifies into
h(tˆ+ 1)(1− 2p) < h(tˆi).
Therefore, we have that
p > 1/2⇒ ∂Fi
∂p
< 0
and
p > 1/2⇒ dtˆi
dp
= − ∂Fi
∂p
/
∂Fi
∂tˆi
> 0.
Claim 2: For the effect of αi on tˆi, we find that
∂EtˆiU
W
i (disclose@tˆi)
∂αi
= (1− θ)
[
∂σi(αi, tˆi)
∂αi
H(tˆi)− ∂
∂αi
pii
tˆi
H(tˆi, τj)
]
(A.7)
and
∂EtˆiU
W
i (disclose@tˆi + 2)
∂αi
= (1− θ)
[
∂σi(αi, tˆi + 2)
∂αi
p2H(tˆi + 2)− ∂
∂αi
pii
tˆi
H(tˆi, τj)
]
. (A.8)
Using (A.7) and (A.8),
∂Fi
∂αi
= (1− θ)
[
∂σi(αi, tˆi)
∂αi
H(tˆi)− ∂σi(αi, tˆi + 2))
∂αi
p2H(tˆi + 2)
]
.
Let σαii (αi, t) denote the partial derivative of σi with respect to αi. Then
dtˆi
dαi
= − ∂Fi
∂αi
/
∂Fi
∂tˆi
> 0
if and only if
σαii (αi, tˆi)H(tˆi) < σ
αi
i (αi, tˆi + 2)p
2H(tˆi + 2).
Claim 3: It is straightforward to see, by equations (18) and (20), that Fi is not a function of
piit or σj(αj , τj).
Claim 4: (1− θ) affects the payoffs in equations (18) and (20) by an equal factor; θ has
therefore no effect on tˆi. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The proof is by
E2U
W
B (disclose@4|τA = 1) = (1− θ)
[
H(2) + p2σB(αB, 4)H(4)
]
> (1− θ)H(2)
= E2U
W
B (disclose@2|τA = 1)
for αB > 0 and p > 0, and the arguments presented in the proof of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The proof for τ∗i (τj) > τj being finite is by the properties of EtU
W
i presented in the
proof of Lemma 2,
lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t|τj) = (1− θ) [1 + αi − σj(αj , τj)] , (A.9)
lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2|τj) = (1− θ)
[
1 + p2αi − σj(αj , τj)
]
, (A.10)
so that
lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t|τj) > lim
t→∞EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2|τj)
for αi > 0 because p < 1, and by the arguments presented in Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. The proof follows from the observation of EtU
W
i (disclose@t+2)−EtUWi (disclose@t) =
EtU
W
i (disclose@t+ 2|τj)− EtUWi (disclose@t|τj). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Let i0 denote a firm i without a patent and i1 a firm i with a patent. The proof
applies to cases 1 and 2.
Case 1: Note that pij∗t (τ∗i ) ∈ [0, 1] for all t. We first consider τi = τ∗i = t0i + 4. The
presented arguments can be readily extended to any τi = τ
∗
i > t
0
i and generalized to any
τi = τ
′
i ≤ τ∗i . The structure of the proof is such that i moves first, i.e., i = A and j = B.
This is without loss of generality.
Let τ∗i = t
0
i + 4. In t
0
j + k, j’s beliefs are denoted by pi
j
t0j+k
, with k = 0, 2. We start
with the second round (when i moves in t = t0i + 2 and j moves in t = t
0
j + 2) and proceeds
backward to the first round (when i moves in t = t0i and j moves in t = t
0
j ).
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Round 2: In t0j + 2, by (29) firm j continues if pi
j
t0j+2
≤ pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i + 4) and stops if pi
j
t0j+2
>
pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i +4). A patend holder firm i’s decision one stage earlier, in t = t
0
i +2, depends on these
beliefs pij
t0j+2
. If a patent holder i1 anticipates firm j to continue, i1 will continue in t = t
0
i +2.
If, instead, i1 anticipates j to stop, i1 will disclose. So, if for pi
j
t0j+2
≤ pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i + 4) firm j in
t = t0j + 2 (one stage after i’s move) has not observed disclosure, then it is because firm i is
either a patent holder (and does not disclose because j will continue) or not a patent holder
(and has nothing to disclose, but decides to continue because (33) holds by assumption).
This means, firm j does not learn from firm i’s behavior firm i’s type and cannot update its
beliefs. The posterior belief pij
t0j+2
is thus equal to the posterior belief pij
t0j
one round earlier,
pij
t0j+2
= pij
t0j
. Hence, if pij
t0j+2
≤ pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i + 4) then pi
j
t0j
≤ pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i + 4). This implies that firm
j continues in t = t0j + 2, and a patent holder firm i1 continues in t = t
0
i + 2, so that firm j’s
beliefs in t = t0j + 2 are pi
j
t0j
≤ pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i + 4). Firm i1 eventually discloses at τ
∗
i = t
0
i + 4.
Round 1: If pij
t0j
≤ pij∗
t0j
(t0i +4) so that j continues, then i1 continues anticipating j to continue.
If j in t = t0j has not observed disclosure, then the above argument applies: firm j cannot
update its beliefs. The posterior belief pij
t0j
is thus equal to the prior belief pij , pij
t0j
= pij .
Hence, if pij
t0j
≤ pij∗
t0j
(t0i + 4) then pi
j ≤ pij∗
t0j
(t0i + 4), and then firm j continues in t = t
0
j and firm
i1 continues in t = t
0
i , so that firm j’s beliefs in t = t
0
j are pi
j ≤ pij∗
t0j
(t0i + 4).
Moreover, if not only pij ≤ pij∗
t0j
(t0i + 4) (so that i1 continues in t = t
0
i and j continues in
t = t0j ) but also pi
j = pij
t0j
≤ pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i + 4) (so that i1 continues in t = t
0
i + 2 and j continues in
t = t0j +2), then both players will continue until t = t
0
i +4 when the patent holder i1 discloses.
Hence, if pij ≤ pij∗
t0j
(t0i +4) and pi
j ≤ pij∗
t0j+2
(t0i +4) or pi
j ≤ min
{
pij∗
t0j+k
(t0i + 4) : k = 0, 2
}
, then
i1 discloses in t = τ
∗
i = t
0
i + 4.
The very same structure applies to τ∗i = t
0
i + 6, τ
∗
i = t
0
i + 8, and so forth. Hence, if for τ
∗
i
the prior belief is
pij ≤ min
{
pij∗
t0j+k
(τ∗i ) : ∀t0j + k < τ∗i with even k ≥ 0
}
so that j always continues as pij is always smaller than pi∗
t0j+k
(τ∗i ) for all even k, then firm i
will disclose in τ∗i . More generally, if for τ
′
i ≤ τ∗i , the prior belief is
pij ≤ min
{
pij∗
t0j+k
(τ ′i) : ∀t0j + k < τ ′i with even k ≥ 0
}
,
in Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) the firms will continue in all t and firm i discloses in
τ ′i .
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Case 2 Because (32) is violated for all t, pij∗t (τ∗i ) > 1 ≥ pijt for all t. Because firm j continues
if pijt ≤ pij∗t (τ∗i ), it continues for all pijt . In PBE firm i continues in all t0i + k < τ∗i and firm j
continues in all t0j + k < τ
∗
i for any pi
j and k > 0, and firm i discloses in t = τ∗i . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Suppose τi = τ
∗
i . Because (31) is violated for all t, pi
j∗
t (τ
∗
i ) < 0 ≤ pijt for all t. Then
because firm j continues if pit ≤ pi∗t (τ∗i ), firm j always stops, irrespective of firm i’s behavior.
Firm i thus chooses to disclose in t0i . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. We now study the cases in which (31) and (32) are satisfied for all t < τ∗i but (33) is
violated for some t in the same range. For simplicity of the argument, we assume that given p,
the LHS of (33) is either monotonically non-decreasing in t or monotonically non-increasing
in t. Moreover, as in the proof of Lemma 5, let i move first, i.e., i = A and j = B. Both
assumptions are without loss of generality.
1. Suppose (33) is violated for low t and satisfied for high t. This applies if the LHS in
(33) is non-decreasing in t. More specifically, let t′ > t0i the highest t for which (33)
is violated and t′ + 1 the lowest one for which (33) is satisfied. If at t = t0j = t
0
i + 1
firm j has observed continue at t = t0i , it can infer that firm i is a patent holder, and
updates its beliefs so that pij
t0j
= pij
t0j+2
= . . . = 1, implying that firm j continues for
all even t < τ∗i in which it takes turn. Whether or not (33) is satisfied or violated
for higher t is irrelevant. A non-patent holder i0 has no incentive in prolonging the
standardization process and will therefore not mimic a patent holder; firm j anticipates
this and correctly infers that it will observe continue only if firm i is a patent holder.
2. Suppose (33) is satisfied for low t and violated for high t. This applies if the LHS in
(33) is non-increasing in t. Let t′ the highest t for which (33) is satisfied and t′ + 1
the earliest one for which (33) is violated. In this scenario, if firm j has not observed
disclosure for all t ≤ t′, then it is because firm i is i0 or firm i is firm i1; that is firm j
does not learn from firm i’s behavior firm i’s type. Therefore, for the conversation to
continue until t′ the analysis in case 1 applies, meaning that the process is sustainable
if j’s prior belief is such that:
pij ≤ min
{
pij∗
t0j+k
(t′) : ∀t0j + k ≤ t′ with even k ≥ 0
}
.
Otherwise, if not such t′ exists than disclosure is not delayed. If t′ has been reached,
from there on two cases must be distinguished, depending on whether t′ + 1 is even or
odd.
• Assume t′ + 1 is odd, so firm i takes turn at t = t′ + 1. If firm j observes that i
continues in t′ + 1, then it will update its beliefs so that pijt′+2 = pi
j
t′+4 = . . . = 1.
Thus for all t ≥ t′ + 2, case 2 applies, meaning that disclosure is at τ˜i = τ∗i .
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• Assume that t′ + 1 is even, so at t′ + 1 firm j takes turn: Then (33) is satisfied
(and a non-patent holder will want to continue) in t′ but is violated in t′+1 when
j moves. This implies that from i’s move, j cannot infer i’s type, and in t′ + 1
will not continue for all pijt but only if pi
j
t′+1 ≤ pij∗t′+1(τ∗i ). Up to t′, j has not been
able to update his beliefs, so that pijt′+1 = pi
j . If pij ≤ pij∗t′+1(τ∗i ), then j continues
in t′+ 1, and i continues in t′ anticipating j’s continuation. For all t > t′+ 2, case
2 applies. If, on the other hand, pij > pij∗t′+1(τ
∗
i ), j stops in t
′ + 1, and i discloses
in t′. Q.E.D.
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